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Abstract
The publicity given to the request by a Western Australian 
man with quadriplegia to have artificial nutrition and 
hydration withdrawn so he could end his life, highlights 
the moral and legal dilemmas inherent in end-of-life 
decision making. In ruling that the withdrawal of the 
life-sustaining measures by the health provider would be 
lawful, the Supreme Court of Western Australia carefully 
analysed the potential application of the Criminal 
Code 1913 (WA). The relevant provisions include 
recent amendments aimed at addressing the question 
of a medical professional’s criminal responsibility for 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 
To date the Queensland legislature has not followed 
the Western Australian lead, despite suggestions by the 
Queensland Guardianship and Administration Tribunal 
that the intersection between the criminal law and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) requires 
clarification. This paper considers whether, pursuant to  
Queensland criminal law, health professionals could 
be held criminally responsible for complying with a 
patient’s request to withdraw life-sustaining measures, 
and accordingly whether amendments should be made to 
the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). 
1 Senior Lecturers, School of Law, James Cook University. The authors 
would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful feedback.
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i  intRoduction
Once viewed as a fiction of the sci-fi film, the prolongation of life by 
the use of mechanical life-sustaining devices is now a reality of modern 
medical science. In many circumstances the timing of a person’s death 
can be controlled by the use of medical technology to an extent not 
considered fifty years ago. The advent of life-sustaining technology 
has raised a number of ethical, moral and legal dilemmas regarding 
end-of-life decision making. Society has been required to consider 
the preservation and sanctity of life and balance it against the right 
to self-determination, personal autonomy, and the right to dignity.2 
Social and moral arguments regarding the intrinsic worth and quality 
of life have come before the courts and have engaged the minds of 
academic commentators.3 As is often the case in the technological age, 
the law has been required to play catch-up, endeavouring to find legal 
justification for medical practices that are viewed as desirable and 
socially acceptable.4
Sixteen years on from the seminal English case of Airedale NHS Trust 
v Bland (Bland),5 which declared lawful the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration from a patient who was in a persistent vegetative 
state, questions still remain as to the criminal responsibility of those 
entrusted with withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment.6 
2 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 859, 864, 891. 
3 See, eg, J Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law 
after Bland’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 481; J.M Finnis, ‘Bland: 
Crossing the Rubicon?’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 329; Andrew 
McGee, ‘Finding a way through the ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal 
of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 357; 
Kristin Savell, ‘Human Rights in the Age of Technology: Can Law Rein in 
the Medical Juggernaut?’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 423.
4 In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 891, 877–878 
both Lord Mustill and Lord Wilkinson-Browne expressed concern about 
the legal justification the court was developing in order to deal with the 
ethically difficult question of withdrawal of nutrition to an ‘alive’ patient. 
Both called for legislative intervention. 
5 [1993] AC 789.
6 In the English case of R (Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] 
EWHC Civ 1003 issues surrounding the circumstances in which a patient 
has a right to demand provision of life-sustaining measures was discussed, 
primarily in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). In relation to 
the withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining measures in the UK, 
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Unlike the situation in the majority of common law countries, Australian 
law remains devoid of a definitive superior court decision from which 
guidance can be drawn as to when and in what circumstances such 
actions will be lawful.7 While this to some extent confirms that generally, 
in Australia, these decisions are being made by consensus with medical 
practitioners, patients and/or families,8 the interaction of the criminal 
law with end-of-life decision making for withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining measures is still not clearly defined. 
The uncertainty in Australia has led to a number of matters recently being 
brought to the attention of the lower courts. In the month of August 2009 
alone, three health care providers sought declarations before courts of 
first instance as to the lawfulness of proposed conduct to terminate life-
sustaining treatment. In the first case the court was asked to consider 
whether it was lawful to comply with an advanced health directive 
that the patient not be given kidney dialysis.9 The second required the 
court to consider whether medical staff would be criminally responsible 
for complying with a request by a competent patient who was not 
terminally ill that the life-sustaining supply of hydration and nutrition 
be discontinued.10 The third questioned whether a health provider could 
cease the forced provision of hydration and nutrition to an elderly patient 
Canada and New Zealand, a ‘best interests’ test is applied, whereas in the 
USA a substituted judgment test is applied. For a discussion and comparison 
of the two tests see Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘A Model for Decision 
Making at the End of Life: Queensland and Beyond’ (Paper presented at 
the 15th World Congress on Medical Law, Sydney, 2004).
7 See, eg, in the UK Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789; 
USA Cruzan v Director of Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 
(1990); Canada, Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR 4th 385; 
New Zealand, Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 
NZLR 235. It should be noted, however, that the legal validity of a pre-
emptive declaration from a civil court as to the lawfulness or otherwise 
of potentially criminal conduct is doubtful, particularly in relation to 
Criminal Code states. See Chris Corns, ‘Withdrawal of Life-Support: 
Some Criminal Prosecution Aspects’ in Ian Freckleton and Kerry Petersen 
(eds), Controversies in Health Law (1999), 44, 54.
8 Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘Charting a course through difficult 
legislative waters: Tribunal decisions on life-sustaining measures’ (2005) 
12 Journal of Law and Medicine 441, 441.   
9 Hunter and New England Area Health Services v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
10 Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229.  
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who was chronically psychotic, suffering from paranoid schizophrenia 
and whose religious obsessions had compelled him to extreme fasting.11 
These cases demonstrate that medical professionals are still uncertain as 
to the legality of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 
Uncertainty as to the potential criminal responsibility of health 
professionals has been recognised as a potential problem for some time. 
The problem is of greater significance in the code jurisdictions, where, 
in the absence of legislative intervention, the courts are more restricted 
in interpreting the criminal law. In 1988 the Western Australian Law 
Reform Commission highlighted these uncertainties as they relate to 
the Griffith Code.12  
Doctors … may face substantial legal problems in relation to 
the provision of medical treatment of terminally ill people…. 
These problems arise because the legal duties [set out in 
the Criminal Code] have been developed to meet problems 
other than the bona fide treatment of patients suffering 
from terminal conditions, and the application of the Code 
provisions to such treatment is uncertain. This uncertainty 
arises because the provisions of the Criminal Code which 
might be relevant are of general application and there have 
been no reported cases in which their operation in the 
present area of concern has been specifically examined. The 
spectre of criminal liability raised by provisions of general 
application is undesirable where doctors are endeavouring to 
practise medicine with a humane concern for the terminally 
ill.13
It is surprising that 20 years passed before the Western Australian 
Parliament took action to address these concerns. The Acts Amendment 
(Consent to Medical Treatment) Act 2008 (WA) not only establishes 
a regime to address medical treatment decisions for patients lacking 
11 Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105.
12 The Law Reform Commission was concerned with the provisions of the 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA); however, at that time, the relevant provisions 
were the same as those found in the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).  
13 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Medical Treatment for 
the Dying, Discussion Paper Project No. 84, (June 1988). For more recent 
statements concerning the uncertainty, see Attorney General/Minister for 
Health Western Australia, Medical Treatment for the Dying, Discussion 
Paper (2005) 8.  
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capacity, but also provides some protection for health professionals 
whose conduct falls within the requirements of the Act. Amongst other 
things the Act amends the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) so as to provide 
protection for those responsible for the withholding or withdrawal of 
medical treatment even in circumstances where death ensues.14 
It is even more surprising that Queensland, the only other Griffith 
Code jurisdiction, is yet to clarify the criminal responsibility of those 
responsible for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 
This is particularly so as Parliament has enacted the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (GAA) which provides a regime of 
decision makers who are able to consent to or refuse medical treatment 
on behalf of an incompetent patient. The ongoing uncertainty has 
been the subject of comment by the Queensland Guardianship and 
Administration Tribunal (the Tribunal) in its statement that:  
the intersection of the Criminal Code 1899 with the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 in the context 
of consent to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
measures is a matter that should be clarified by the 
legislature.15
In considering how to address these concerns, this paper seeks to explore 
and explain the intersection between Queensland criminal laws and the 
common law and statutory rights of patients. The paper is divided into 
four parts. Part two considers the issue of consent to medical treatment 
for both competent patients and those with impaired capacity. Part three 
of the paper examines the provisions of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) 
(the Code) that may be applied in circumstances where a patient dies 
as a result of a health professional withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment in accordance with the patient’s common law and/
or statutory rights. In this context, s 285 of the Code is of particular 
importance as it imposes a duty on a person to provide the necessaries 
of life to those under that person’s charge. Part four examines how the 
Code may be interpreted so as to avoid conflict between a patient’s 
rights to refuse treatment and a health professional’s duty to provide it. 
14 Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) Act 2008 (WA) s 18.  See 
also Hon Sue Ellery (Parliamentary Secretary) Second Reading Speech, 
Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) Bill 2006, 6 December 
2006, 9244‒9245.  
15 Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, [107].
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In the final part the paper addresses the need for reform and includes 
an evaluation of the recent reforms to the Criminal Code 1913 (WA). 
It concludes by suggesting the need for legislative intervention in 
Queensland to ensure that health professionals can be confident in 
complying with a patient’s request for refusal of treatment.  
ii  a Patient’s RiGHt to Have life-sustaininG tReatMent 
WitHHeld oR WitHdRaWn   
A  The Rights of Competent Patients
The common law clearly and unambiguously gives affect to a competent16 
adult patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, even though the refusal 
will lead to the person’s death.17 The right, which gives expression to 
the basic principles of patient autonomy and self-determination, ‘may 
be seen as a basic human right protected by the common law’.18 This 




16 The term competence is defined consistently with the common law 
definition of the term, and it tends to be used interchangeably with the term 
capacity.  See, eg, Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All 
ER 819, 824; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229. 
See also Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing 
(2007) 121 where it is argued that the preferable term is competence rather 
than capacity.     
17 See, eg, RE T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] AC 789; Department 
of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s case) (1992) 
175 CLR 218.  In Victoria, South Australia and the ACT, statutory force 
has been given to this principle. See Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT); 
Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Medical 
Treatment Act 1998 (VIC). See also Lindy Willmott, Ben White and 
Michelle Howard, ‘Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and 
Life-sustaining Medical Treatment’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law 
Review 211; Cameron Stewart, ‘Advanced Directives, the Right to Die and 
the Common Law: Recent Problems with Blood Transfusions’ (1999) 23 
University of Melbourne Law Review 6.
18 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871, 882 (Lord 
Scarman). See also Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland [1993] 
AC 789, 826 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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duty) to invade the patient’s bodily integrity so as to treat the patient’.19 
It is a right that has been clearly enshrined in the GAA.20
A health professional’s obligation to respect a competent patient’s 
wishes is paramount and accordingly must be complied with even 
though the professional is of the view that compliance is not in the 
patient’s best interests.21 In the words of Lord Donaldson in Re T,22 ‘it 
matters not whether the [patient’s] reasons for the refusal were rational 
or irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.23 To do otherwise would 
offend the principle of bodily inviolability amounting to a trespass to 
the person.24 A vivid illustration of the law can be found in the English 
decision of Re B.25 In that case a 42 year old woman with tetraplegia 
refused consent to the continuation of artificial ventilation against the 
express advice of her treating doctors who were concerned that she had 
not exhausted all rehabilitation options. After the doctors refused to 
19 Mark Stauch, Kay Wheat, and John Tingle, Text, Cases and Materials on 
Medical Law (2002), 96. Emphasis added. The reason for this will become 
apparent in part three of the paper.
20 Section 5(b) states that ‘the right to make decisions includes the right to 
make decisions with which others may not agree’, and in reference to Health 
Care Principle Schedule 1, s 12(4) states that ‘the health care principle does 
not affect any right an adult has to refuse health care’. See RE RWG [2000] 
QGAAT 49, [55].  
21 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789; Re B (adult: refusal 
of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. There is perhaps one exception 
to the patient’s paramount right to refuse treatment. The exception arises 
where the treatment is necessary to preserve a viable foetus. For a discussion 
of the principle and the possible exception see Hunter and New England 
Area Health Services v A [2009] NSWSC 761 [9]‒[21] [ McDougall J].  
22 [1992] 3 WLR 782.
23 Ibid, 799. See also Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] 2 FCR (UK) 1 
[18]; Hunter and New England Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761, 
[15]; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229, [27]. 
24 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 864, 891; RE T 
(adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] AC 789; Department of Health and 
Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 
232, 233, 264, 309, 310. Section 245 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) 
defines assault as inclusive of the common law tort of battery; however, a 
civil action in Queensland is still one of battery, although Criminal Code 
excuses and defences may be applicable to the civil action. See White v 
Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75.
25 [2002] 2 All ER 449.
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accede to her request, she sought a declaration from the court as to her 
capacity, and she sought damages for trespass for the continued and 
unwanted treatment by the hospital. The court granted her declaration, 
holding that the hospital was in fact trespassing against her and awarded 
nominal damages.
The criminal law augments a patient’s right to refuse treatment by 
way of the offence of assault.26 In this respect the Criminal Code of 
Queensland is no exception. It is unlawful to strike, touch, move or to 
apply force of any kind without consent.27 
It must be noted that there are situations including medical emergency 
or necessity where a health professional who treats without consent 
will be protected from civil liability.28 Until recently, the protection 
from criminal responsibility in such circumstances was less certain.29 
However, in September 2009, the Queensland Parliament enacted a 
new s 282 excuse of surgical operations and medical treatment.30 The 
26 Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s 
case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232, 233, 264. Although the Court’s comments 
are in the context of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT), they are of general 
application.  
27 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 245, 246. Although it is interesting to note 
that failure to comply with a request to cease lawful treatment may not 
amount to assault, where the failure does not involve application of force 
to ‘such a degree as to cause injury or personal discomfort’ (Criminal Code 
s 285).
28 See, eg, Lord Goff’s discussion of necessity in In Re F (mental patient: 
sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 74‒76; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) 
[1993] AC 789, 867. Loane Skene refers to the defence of necessity being 
wider than one of medical emergency. For a full discussion of the situations 
where an exception to the general rule of consent to medical treatment, 
see, Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights Duties, Claims and 
Defences (2nd ed, 2004), 93–97, 169.
29 The wording of the excuse of extraordinary emergency made it difficult 
to apply to activities of health professionals. Section 25 of the Code states 
that a ‘person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission done or 
made under such circumstances of a sudden or extraordinary emergency 
that an ordinary person possessing ordinary powers of self-control could 
not reasonably be expected to act otherwise’. It is difficult to contemplate 
the application or the ordinary person requirement within the context of 
provisions of health services. 
30 Criminal Code (Medical Treatment) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) s 3. The 
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excuse provides, amongst other things, that a person is not criminally 
responsible for conducting a surgical operation or medical treatment 
provided that: it was conducted in good faith and with reasonable skill; 
it was for the patient’s benefit; and the treatment was reasonable ‘having 
regard to the patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of 
the case’.31 The section is sufficiently broad to apply in most situations 
where a health professional provides life-sustaining treatment in 
circumstances of an emergency.32 
B  The Rights of Incompetent Patients
The right to refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining 
treatment, extends at common law to situations where the patient has 
expressed his or her desire in advance of losing capacity to consent.33 In 
Queensland the GAA and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (PAA) 
give restricted legislative effect to this right through the recognition 
of an advance health directive.34 Such a directive will only operate 
where the patient has a terminal illness or condition that is incurable or 
irreversible and which is expected to kill the patient within one year; 
the patient is in a persistent vegetative state; the patient is permanently 
unconscious and there is no reasonable prospects that the patient will 
regain consciousness; and the patient has an illness or injury and there is 
Act repealed the existing s 282 excuse and replaced it with a similar more 
broadly applicable excuse.   
31 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 282(1). 
32 The section also has the potential to impact on a patient’s right to refuse 
treatment. See, eg, the discussion of Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v 
Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 in Part 3 below.
33 This common law right has been given statutory force in most jurisdictions 
in Australia. See Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA); Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT); Natural Death Act 1988 (NT); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA). For a discussion as to 
the nature of the right to make advance health directives see Ben White 
and Lindy Willmott, ‘Will you do as I ask? Compliance with instructions 
about health care in Queensland’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 77; Lindy Willmott, Ben White and 
Michelle Howard, ‘Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and 
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law 
Review 211.
34 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 66A; Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (Qld) ss 35, 36. 
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no reasonable prospect that the patient will recover to the extent that he 
or she can be sustained without continued life-sustaining measures.35   
For the majority of patients who have not expressed their views by way 
of an advance health directive, power of attorney, or living will prior to 
losing capacity, medical decisions are, of necessity, made by others. In 
furtherance of the principle of self-determination and patient autonomy, 
the GAA provides a regime of potential persons (the first applicable 
in the list becomes the decision-maker) to make certain decisions on 
behalf of the incompetent patient.36 Where there is an inability to reach 
consensus about the proposed treatment,37 the Tribunal is empowered 
to provide guidance, declaratory relief and, where required, consent on 
behalf of the impaired patient. The decision-making ability applies to 
‘health care’ matters, which include:
Withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure 
for the adult if the commencement or continuation of the 
measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good 
medical practice.38
The legislation provides a complex set of guidelines in the form of 
‘General Principles’ and the ‘Health Care Principle’ which are used to 
inform the substitute decision maker and assist appropriate decision 
making.39 The intention of the legislature is to provide a consent 
mechanism that allows the patient a degree of autonomy,40 while at 
35 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2). 
36 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66 provides for 
substitute decision makers as follows: Tribunal appointed guardian, 
attorney appointed by the incompetent adult by virtue of advance health 
directive or enduring power of attorney, statutory health attorney (this is 
defined and a list again in order of priority is provided including spouse, 
carer (not paid), close friend or relation, adult guardian).
37 Often because of disagreement between the health provider and family or 
different members of the family as to the appropriate form of treatment. 
See, eg, RE MC [2003] QGAAT 13; RE TM [2002] QGAAT 1; Northridge 
v Central Sydney Area Health Service [2000] NSWSC 1241.
38 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Schedule 2, s 5 (2).
39 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 11.
40 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Health Care Principle 
12(2) (a) and (3) require the taking into account of the patient’s wishes if 
known. Note however the suggestion that if Health Care Principle 12(1)
(b)(ii) referring to the exercise of the power in accordance with adult’s 
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the same time ensuring the grave decision regarding withholding or 
withdrawing of life-sustaining measures41 accords with good medical 
practice.42 
An incompetent patient’s right of autonomy, as with those of a 
competent patient, are protected by the common law civil action of 
battery and the Criminal Code offence of assault. Furthermore, the 
rights of patients without capacity are reinforced by s 79 of the GAA, 
which makes it an offence for a doctor to carry out health care on a 
patient with impaired capacity without consent. The legislation does, 
however, provide health professionals with some protection from both 
civil and criminal action.43 Importantly, the legislation provides that a 
person ‘is not liable for an act or omission to any greater extent than 
if the act or omission happened with the adult’s consent and the adult 
had capacity to consent’.44 Therefore, the responsibility of a health 
professional for the consequences of withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, with consent, does not differ according to whether 
the patient was or was not competent.
The question thus remains as to the circumstances in which a health 
professional will be liable for withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment? Or more precisely for the purpose of this paper: 
in what circumstances could a health professional be held criminally 
responsible? 
Unfortunately the PAA and the GAA fail to clarify the question. Instead 
the Acts tend to fuel the uncertainty as both clearly state that nothing 
contained within them authorises, justifies or excuses the killing of 
another.45 Furthermore, both Acts provide that s 284 (consent by a person 
‘best interests’ is applied, the patient’s views may not be relevant. See Ben 
White and Lindy Willmott above n 33, 82.
41 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Sch 2, s 5A–(1). 
42 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Sch 2, s 5(2). Unlike 
the application of an advance health directive, the only limitation on a 
substitute decision maker when deciding to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures is that the decision not to commence or continue with 
treatment must be in accordance with good medical practice
43 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 63, 63A, 64. 
44 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 80, 77. 
45 Power of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 37; Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (Qld) s 238.
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to his or her own death does not relieve the person who caused the death 
of criminal responsibility) and Chapter 28 (the homicide and suicide 
provisions) of the Criminal Code are unaffected by the provisions of 
the PAA and GAA.46 
iii  PossiBle offence in Queensland foR tHe WitHdRaWal  
and WitHHoldinG of life-sustaininG tReatMent 
A  Homicide Offences under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)
The Code defines the offence of homicide as causing the death of 
another either directly or indirectly in circumstances where the killing 
is unlawful in that it is not authorised, justified or excused.47 The 
homicide will be murder if the Crown is able to prove that the accused 
intended to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm and manslaughter if 
the Crown is unable to prove such intent.48 However, the Code provides 
for two alternative routes or ‘streams’ by which an accused can be held 
criminally responsible for the death of another.  Where there is evidence 
of a positive act resulting in death, the prosecution will be through one 
or other of the ‘two streams’.49 The first is referred to as the Chapter 27 
‘stream’ or negligence route. The second is the Chapter 28 ‘stream’ or 
direct route. However, a case based on an omission can only be brought 
46 Power of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 37; Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (Qld) s 238. These provisions, amongst others, have caused 
commentators to question the relationship between the homicide provisions 
of the Criminal Code and a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
or have it refused or withdrawn on his or her behalf. See, eg, Ben White 
and Lindy Willmott, ‘Re-thinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions 
for Queensland’ (An Issues Paper reviewing the legislation governing 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, Queensland 
University of Technology, 2005) Issue 14, 82.
47 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 291, 293. 
48 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 300, 302(1)(a) and 310. Discussion of the 
constructive murder provisions set out in s 302 (1)(b)‒(e) of the Criminal 
Code is beyond the scope of this article as is the excuse and the defence of 
provocation, s 304 and diminished responsibility, s 304A. 
49  R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348 [Thomas J]. See also B White, A Garwood-
Gowers and L Willmott, ‘Manslaughter under the Griffith Code: Rowing 
not so gently down two streams of law’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 
217. Although the two stream analysis has only ever been applied by the 
courts to the offence of manslaughter the rational for its application applies 
equally to the offence of murder.  
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via the first ‘stream’. This is because an omission to act does not attract 
liability except where it is established that there was a duty imposed 
by law upon the person to act or perform a duty, and that the duty was 
breached. The provisions in Chapter 27 of the Code have a dual function. 
Not only do they provide the bases for establishing responsibility for 
negligent acts, but they also create duties. Breach of the duty does not 
in itself create an offence; it merely provides the quality of conduct 
whereby, if death results, it will lead to the offence of either murder 
or manslaughter.50 Therefore, before determining which ‘stream’ 
would apply to a health professional, who withholds or withdraws life-
sustaining treatment, it is necessary to determine whether such conduct 
is either an act or an omission. 
B  The Omission / Act Distinction
Both at common law and under the Code, the law distinguishes between 
positive acts and omissions to act. While there is no authority from a 
superior Australian court classifying the withholding or withdrawing 
of life-sustaining treatment as either an act or omission, there is a body 
of persuasive international authority that has defined such conduct as 
an omission. In Bland,51 the House of Lords held that the withdrawal 
by doctors of nutrition and hydration from a patient who had remained 
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for three years would not be 
unlawful. Their Lordships’ justification for the decision lay in the 
acceptance that the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was an 
omission, thereby distinguishing it from a positive act that causes the 
death of the patient. By analogy the withholding of medical treatment 
is also readily conceived as an omission.52 Lord Goff referred to the 
fine distinction between the act by the medical professional and those 
of an ‘interloper’, the former’s conduct amounting to an omission, the 
latter’s conduct a positive act. His Lordship reasoned that by failing to 
treat or by discontinuing treatment, the medical professionals would be 
merely allowing the patient to die by natural causes, thus the conduct 
can be seen as amounting to an omission, whereas an ‘interloper’ who 
50 R G Kenny, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western 
Australia (7th ed, 2008), [8.38]. See also R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 
1 Qd R 456.
51 [1993] AC 789.
52 As Lord Butler-Sloss noted in the Court of Appeal in Bland, ‘Medical 
ethics draw no distinction between the withholding of treatment and the 
withdrawing of treatment’, 818.
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turns off the life-sustaining measures, is actively interrupting attempts 
to prolong life.53 
In Bland the Court concluded that it was no longer in the patient’s ‘best 
interests’ for the life-sustaining treatment to be continued. Therefore, 
the medical professionals no longer owed a duty to provide such 
treatment and accordingly could not be criminally responsible for any 
omission to treat. This included the withdrawal of the artificial nutrition 
and hydration. Integral to this argument was the conclusion that the 
provision of artificial hydration and nutrition amounted to medical 
treatment.54
In coming to their decision a number of their Lordships grappled 
with the moral dilemma that their decision sanctioned the intentional 
termination of a patient’s life. The legal sanctioning of any form of 
killing, whether by an omission or a positive act, offends the entrenched 
doctrine of the sanctity of life.55 Adherence to the doctrine protects the 
vulnerable from the ‘slippery slope’ that is argued may result from the 
legalisation of euthanasia.56 The House of Lords recognised, however, 
that the doctrine of sanctity of life is not absolute; it yields in certain 
circumstances to the right to self-determination or autonomy.57 By 
53 [1993] AC 789, 866.
54 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 870 (Lord Goff), 858 
(Lord Keith), 878 (Lord Lowry).
55 The right to life is a fundamental principle of international human rights. The 
right to life is recognised in many conventions and declarations including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of that 
Convention provides that ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life, 
the right shall be protected by law and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his or her right to life’. 
56 John Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after 
Bland’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 481, 483. Keown notes that the 
principle does allow justifiable lethal force in self-defence, prosecution of 
just war, and execution in accordance with law. Cf Peter Singer, Rethinking 
Life and Death (1994) who advocates for the sanctioning of intentional 
killings in some circumstances (i.e. euthanasia).
57 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 
819–23 (Butler-Sloss), 826–8 (Hoffman), 859 (Lord Keith). Cf Keown, 
above n 3, where he argues that in Bland the Court misunderstood the 
doctrine of sanctity of life with one of quality of life. Keown refers to the 
doctrine as not ‘requiring the preservation of life at all costs’; however, 
the doctrine can never sanction intentional killing or ‘life-shortening’ in 
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applying the act/omission distinction, the Court was able to maintain 
the fine line that distinguishes between the unlawful lethal injection and 
the lawful withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This distinction is 
maintained notwithstanding that the unlawful acts would lead to a swift 
and painless death whilst the lawful omission may entail a prolonged 
and sometimes painful death.58   
While there is yet to be any superior Australian or, more specifically, 
Queensland court decision that accepts the authority of Bland, there 
have been a number of lower court and tribunal decisions that either 
expressly or by implication endorsed the Bland determination.59 Most 
recently in Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter,60 although the Court 
did not expressly address the question as to whether the withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment was an omission or an act, the decision is 
based on the assumption that the withdrawal of such treatment by health 
professionals is an omission. The Court only considered the plaintiff’s 
potential criminal responsibility as a possible breach of the first ‘stream’ 
of homicide and only then as a possible breach of a duty and not as 
a negligent act. It is therefore submitted that, given the strength of 
international authority and acceptance by leading criminal text writers 
and commentators, notwithstanding the limited domestic authority, the 
law as expressed in Bland also applies to the Code.61 
Accordingly, to be found criminally responsible for the death of a 
patient where a medical professional withholds or withdraws treatment, 
it must first be established that he or she was under a legal duty to act. 
The applicable duty is found in s 285 of the Code.62 Although other duty 
any form. He therefore argues that Bland should have been argued not as 
intentionally causing death, but as withdrawing futile treatment with the 
foresight that the side-effect would be the death of the patient. But note the 
cogent criticism of this argument by Andrew McGee, above n 3.
58 This is so at least for the family and carers. See RE MC [2003] QGAAT 
13. See also Edward Grant and Clarke Forsythe, ‘The Plight of the Last 
Friend: Legal Issues for Physicians and Nurses in Providing Nutrition and 
Hydration’ (1987) 2 Issues in Law and Medicine 277.
59 Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 49, [56]. 
60 [2009] WASC 229 (‘Rossiter’).
61 See, eg, Kenny [12.6] above n 50. See also Eric Colvin and Justice John 
McKechnie, ‘Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia: Cases 
and Commentary’ (5th ed 2008) [3.12].
62 Section 285 requires a person having charge of another to provide that 
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provisions are also potentially relevant to the circumstances where a 
medical professional withdraws or withholds life-sustaining treatment, 
their application is less certain, and to date the Tribunal and courts have 
focused on the relevance of s 285 in such circumstances.63 
C  The Medical Professional’s Duty under  
s 285 of the Criminal Code
There has been only limited judicial consideration of the s 285 duty. 
In R v Young,64 Lucas J, with whom Hoare J agreed, stated that duty 
‘imposed by s 285 is for practical purposes in the same terms as 
that imposed by the common law’.65 Lucas J cited with approval the 
common law decision R v Charlotte Smith66 where Erle CJ stated ‘[t]he 
law is undisputed that if a person having the care and custody of another 
who is helpless neglects to supply him with the necessaries of life and 
thereby causes or accelerates his death it is a criminal offence’.67 
Section 285 gives effect to the duty in the following terms:  
Duty to provide necessaries
It is the duty of every person having charge of another who 
is unable by reason of age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, 
detention, or any other cause, to withdraw himself or herself 
from such charge, and who is unable to provide himself 
or herself with the necessaries of life, whether the charge 
person with the necessaries of life where that person is unable to do so 
themselves because of sickness, age, detention or unsoundness of mind. 
Section 288 states that every person who undertakes to provide medical 
treatment to another has a duty to do so with reasonable skill and reasonable 
care. Section 290 requires a person who has undertaken to do an act, the 
omission of which would be injurious to life or health, to perform the act. 
In effect the duty imposed on the doctor in relation to the withholding or 
withdrawing of life-sustaining measures would be the same under these 
provisions.
63 RE RWG [2000] QGAAT 49; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter 
[2009] WASC 229. See, also, Medical Treatment for the Dying: Discussion 
Paper (2005 Attorney General/Minister for Health Western Australia), 
9–11. 
64 [1969] Qd R. 417.
65 [1969] Qd R. 417, 441.
66 (1865) 10 Cox C.C. 82.
67 R v Young [1969] Qd R. 417, 441.
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is undertaken under a contract, or is imposed by law, or 
arises by reason of any act, whether lawful or unlawful, of 
the person who has such charge, to provide for that other 
person the necessaries of life; and the person is held to have 
caused any consequences which result to the life or health 
of the other person by reason of any omission to perform 
that duty.
In order to sustain a successful prosecution, the Crown must firstly 
establish that the accused had the ‘charge’ of another and, in the context 
of withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, that that 
person, through sickness or age, was unable to withdraw from the 
charge. Secondly, the Crown must establish that the patient was unable 
to provide for him or herself the ‘necessaries of life’. A breach of the 
duty would be established if the Crown proves that the accused failed to 
provide the necessaries of life. If it is further established that the accused 
intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, the offence would be 
one of murder, if not, the offence would be one of manslaughter.68 
Necessaries of life have been held to amount to such things as 
medical assessment or treatment,69 food, shelter and clothing.70 In the 
Queensland decision of R v Nielsen,71 a step-father and mother were 
convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life72 to their thirty-
one year old daughter who was in their care. The daughter who suffered 
from schizophrenia had been kept in her bedroom without medication 
68 MacDonald and MacDonald [1904] St R Qd 151. The Crown must 
prove that the accused was ‘grossly negligent’ in circumstances where 
the prosecution is based on a positive act. Arguably it is also necessary to 
prove ‘gross negligence’ where the position is based on a non-intentional 
omission. Whether ‘gross negligence’ must be established in circumstances 
where the prosecution is based on an intentional omission is both unresolved 
and beyond the scope of this paper. See the recent decisions of R v BBD 
[2006] 1 Qd R 478 and R v Clark (2007) 171 A Crim R 532 where the 
Court of Appeal considered the appropriate direction that should be given 
to a jury in respect to the degree of negligence that must be proved.   
69 Smith [1908] QWN 13. 
70 MacDonald and MacDonald [1904] St R Qd 151; R v Nielsen (2001) 121 
A Crim R 231, 243‒44. 
71 (2001) 121 A Crim R 231.
72 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 325. The charge was one of failing to provide 
the necessaries of life which in the circumstances required the Crown to 
prove a breach of s 285 of the Code. 
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or adequate food. At the time the authorities took her into care she 
weighed 42.5 kg some 12-16 kg below her ‘expected weight’ and, due 
to the lack of medication, she was ‘grossly disturbed’.  The Court of 
Appeal held that due to her psychotic state the daughter was under the 
charge of her parents within the meaning of s 285. It also held that the 
term necessaries of life, as set out in s 285, included anti-psychotic 
drugs and adequate food. Although not raised as a ground of appeal, the 
Court also stated that the parents’ failure to seek medial assessment of 
their daughter for a period of five years also meant that they had failed 
to provide the necessaries of life.73 
It would therefore seem beyond doubt that life-sustaining treatment 
such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, kidney 
dialysis and the provision of artificial hydration and nutrition together 
with other medications are necessaries of life.74 Prima facie a medical 
professional who withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment from 
a patient under his or her charge would seem to be failing to comply with 
his or her duty under s 285. However, it would seem extremely unlikely 
that a medical professional who was acting pursuant to a patient’s 
request, an advanced health directive or a directive of a substitute 
decision maker would be found by a jury to have breached his or her duty. 
Even so, leaving the criminal responsibility of medical professionals in 
the hands of the jury is particularly problematic as determinations will 
invariably be made on a case-by-case basis. Medical professionals could 
not with certainty withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment as 
the prospect of prosecution and perhaps a remote chance of conviction 
remain. Furthermore, a court that was requested to provide declaratory 
relief as to whether withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
treatment would attract criminal responsibility is perhaps less likely to 
provide such relief in circumstances where the question to be answered 
is entirely one for a jury. It is therefore preferable that s 285 of the Code 
be interpreted to exclude its application to these situations or that the 
Code provide a specific excuse applicable in circumstances where a 
health professional withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment. 
How this may be achieved is considered in the next section.
73 (2001) 121 A Crim R 231, 243, 244.
74 See MacDonald and MacDonald [1904] St R Qd 151; R v Nielsen (2001) 
121 A Crim R 231; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 
229. See also P Mac Farlane, ‘What is food-withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration and other matters’ (2003) 24 The Queensland Lawyer 135.  
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iv  avoidinG cRiMinal ResPonsiBility foR WitHdRaWinG oR 
WitHHoldinG life-sustaininG tReatMent
A  Circumstances where Medical Treatment  
is not a Necessary of Life 
Life-sustaining medical treatment may not always be considered a 
necessary of life. The Tribunal and commentators have argued that 
health professionals are not criminally responsible in circumstances 
where medical treatment is merely artificially prolonging the moment 
of death without any prospect of recovery by the patient. In such 
circumstances treatment has no therapeutic function and, accordingly, 
is not a necessary of life.75 As the Code duty is in the same or similar 
terms to the common law duty, such an interpretation finds support in 
the United Kingdom cases and in the decisions of other common law 
jurisdictions.76 In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General,77 
Thomas J held that a ventilator which induced heartbeat and breathing 
could not be construed as a ‘necessary of life’ in circumstances where it 
had no therapeutic benefit as the patient was beyond recovery.78 
Support for Thomas J’s approach can be found in Re RWG79 where the 
Tribunal quoted from MacFarlane’s Queensland Health Handbook 
that ‘...the duty is to provide only medical necessaries and would not 
generally extend to the provision of extraordinary measures’.80 The 
distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary means’ was defined 
by bioethicist Elizabeth Hepburn as:
75 See, eg, Re RWG. [2000] QGAAT 49; Peter MacFarlane and Simon Reid, 
2004 Queensland Health Law Handbook (14th ed, 2004).
76 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789; Cruzan v Director of 
Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990); Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu 
de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR 4th 385; Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney 
General [1993] 1 NZLR 235. Limiting the definition of necessaries of life 
to those that have a therapeutic purpose or function also has the support of 
some commentators. See eg, Glanville L. Williams, Textbook of Criminal 
Law (2nd ed., 1983), 379; Peter MacFarlane and Simon Reid, above n 75. 
See also Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 
235; Re RWG. [2000] QGAAT 49.
77 [1993] 1 NZLR 235.
78 Ibid.
79 [2000] QGAAT 49.
80 Ibid [57] 
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The term ‘extraordinary means’ should not be construed 
to mean ‘unusual’, but rather should be understood as 
“disproportionate”; it reflects the outcome of a process 
of balancing burdens and benefits by which a particular 
procedure is judged worthwhile. In this context ‘extraordinary 
means’ is a moral rather than a medical term. Inherent in 
this approach is a notion that competing values and goals 
need to be assessed and the overall benefit of the treatment 
to the patient considered. This procedure has sometimes 
been expressed in terms of proportionality that is the likely 
gain must be proportional to the hardship associated with the 
treatment’.81
The Tribunal in Re RWG further stated that, although there is a lack of 
authority from Queensland courts, the decisions from other jurisdictions 
‘indicate that a doctor is under no duty to provide medical treatment, 
which will provide no benefit to the patient and is not in the patient’s 
best interests’.82 Under the ‘best interest’ test, although the presumed 
wishes of the patient, and those known of the family, are considered, the 
determination of what is in the best interests of the patient ultimately 
rests with the medical profession.83 
Where the GAA applies, decisions made to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining measures can only be taken after consideration of the General 
Principles and the Health Care Principles as set out in the Act.84 Under 
81 Ibid [59] quoting from Elizabeth Hepburn, Of Life and Death (1996). 
For an alternative view which posits that there is no distinction between 
extraordinary and ordinary means either by the nature of the treatment or 
morally see Ian N Olver, Is Death Ever Preferable to Life? (2002), 57. 
82 Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 49, [64]. As stated above, the ‘best interests’ test 
which originated in Bland is the preferred test in the UK and a number of 
other common law jurisdictions. This can be contrasted with the substituted 
judgment test which is applied in the US. For a comprehensive discussion 
of both see Willmott and White above n 6.
83 Reference can be made to the civil jurisdiction where the test applied 
in the UK in negligence actions is the Bolan test which refers to a body 
of responsible medical opinion. This is no longer the common law in 
Australia, although legislative enactments in the various Civil Liability 
Acts have provided a defence to professionals who act in accordance with 
medical practice which is widely accepted by peer professional opinion as 
competent professional practice. See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 
22.
84 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 11. 
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these provisions the decision must be made in a way least restrictive of 
the adult’s rights,85 where it is necessary and appropriate to maintain 
or promote the adult’s health or well-being or is in the adult’s best 
interests.86 Further, the adult’s views and wishes are to be taken into 
account, as are those of the health providers.87 Any decision made by 
the decision-maker, in order to be effective, cannot ‘operate unless the 
adult’s health provider reasonably considers the commencement or 
continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with 
good medical practice’.88  This then leaves the ultimate decision in the 
hands of the medical professional.89 
While not expressed in terms of ‘futility’ or ‘necessaries of life’ it is 
submitted that the requirements of the GAA are such that it would be 
extremely unlikely that any decision made in accordance with the Act to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment could be regarded as a 
‘necessary of life’, for the purposes of s 285. Accordingly, no duty would 
arise and a health professional could not be held criminally responsible 
for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures where the 
treatment is artificially prolonging the moment of death. 
In summary, therefore, the argument that life-sustaining treatment is not 
a necessary of life applies to an incompetent patient in circumstances 
85 See Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 where the Tribunal held that provision of 
artificial hydration and nutrition through a PEG was intrusive, burdensome 
and futile in the circumstances and was not the least restrictive option. See 
also Northbridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 
549.
86 Power of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) Health Care Principle 12 and 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Sch 1, Pt 2. It has been 
suggested that as ‘best interests’ is not defined in the PAA or GAA would 
import the common law meaning as per Bland and Auckland. See, eg, Lindy 
Willmott and Ben White, ‘Charting a course through difficult legislative 
waters: Tribunal decisions on life-sustaining measures’ (2005) 12 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 441, 450.
87 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Heath Care Principle 
12(2).
88 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 66A.
89 Note, however, that in Re RWG. [2000] QGAAT 49, the Tribunal took the 
view that this was also a matter that required determination of the Tribunal, 
in situations where the Tribunal was asked to provide consent. This is due 
to the definition under the GAA of health care matter. See also Willmott and 
White, above n 86.
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where Parliament has prescribed that the decision to refrain from or 
cease such treatment can be made. It may also apply to a competent 
patient who is close to death or who is suffering intolerable pain with 
no chance of relief or recovery. 
B  When is a Patient under a Health Professional’s Charge?
As discussed above, a competent patient’s common law right to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment applies notwithstanding that the reasons for 
the decision are ‘irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.90 Therefore, 
medical professionals can be faced with a request by a competent patient 
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in circumstances where 
to do so may not in their view, be in the ‘best interest’ of the patient. A 
patient may, however, refuse life-sustaining treatment in circumstances 
where treatment would ensure a continuation of life perhaps without or 
with only limited pain and suffering and perhaps with or without the 
possibility of a full or partial recovery. In such circumstances the life-
sustaining treatment would be a necessary of life. Therefore, it would 
seem that the obligations of medical professionals as imposed by s 285 
are potentially in conflict with a competent patient’s right to refuse 
treatment.  
It has been argued therefore that, as the corollary to a patient’s right to 
refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining measures, a health 
professional’s duty to provide such treatment only arises in certain 
circumstances. Two approaches have been put forward to limit the 
circumstances when a patient is under a health professional’s charge. 
The first is based on the argument that patients who have capacity are 
not under the charge of their health providers. In Rossiter91 Martin CJ 
of the Supreme Court of Western Australia favoured the view that a 
patient who requires life-sustaining treatment is not necessarily under 
the charge of medical staff. In reference to the identical provision to that 
of s 285 of the Code His Honour states:   
[T]he reference to a person ‘having charge of another’ is 
a reference to a person who, by reason of one or more of 
the various disabilities identified in the section, lacks the 
90 Re T [1992] 3 WLR 782, 799. See also Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust 
[2002] 2 FCR (UK) 1 [18]; Hunter and New England Health Service v A 
[2009] NSWSC 761 [15]; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] 
WASC 229 [27]. 
91 [2009] WASC 229. 
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capacity to direct or control their own destiny and is therefore 
dependent upon the person ‘having charge’ of them.92  
The defendant who suffered from quadriplegia was generally unable 
to move, he required services including turning in bed, assistance 
with bowel movement, physiotherapy and he received nutrition and 
hydration through a PEG. 93 He was not terminally ill and he could 
have continued to live for many years, although his condition would 
have gradually deteriorated. Mr Rossiter therefore lacked the ‘physical 
capacity to control his own destiny’.94 He was, however, capable of 
evaluating information and making informed decisions as to his own 
health care. Mr Rossiter had received advice as to the consequence and 
effects of discontinuing the provision of nutrition and hydration and he 
had responded on many occasions, by talking through a tracheotomy, 
that he wanted that service to cease. Martin CJ concluded that, as Mr 
Rossiter was competent to make ‘informed and insightful decisions’ as 
to his own treatment, he was not, in the context of the duty provision, 
in the charge of the plaintiff health provider.95 Although there was 
insufficient evidence to reach a conclusion, Martin CJ also suggested 
that Mr Rossiter may have had the financial capacity to control the 
direction that his future care could take. If his financial situation was 
such that he could have left Brightwater for the services of another 
health provider then Mr Rossiter was not ‘unable to withdraw himself’ 
from the charge of the plaintiff.96      
The approach adopted by Martin CJ enabled His Honour to reconcile 
the rights of patients with the duty of health professionals as imposed 
by the criminal law. However, with due respect to His Honour, it is 
submitted that the approach adopted does not stand close scrutiny. First 
the language of the identical provision to s 285 of the Code does not 
support a conclusion that persons with the mental capacity to control 
their future are not under the care of others. The section refers to those 
who due to ‘age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, detention, or any other 
cause’ are unable to withdraw themselves from the care of another. The 
92 [2009] WASC 229, [39].  
93 A percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube (PEG) through which the 
patient receives nutrition and hydration.
94 [2009] WASC 229, [40].  
95 [2009] WASC 229, [40].  
96 [2009] WASC 229, [40].
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second problem with the approach is that it is not capable of general 
application. Take for example the hypothetical case of a quadriplegic 
patient who developed a serious life threatening skin problem because 
medical staff failed to provide adequate removal of excrement and/or 
bathing. In such circumstances a member of the medical staff could 
face charges for an offence such as negligent acts causing harm, which 
would require that the Crown prove a breach of the duty provision. It 
seems highly unlikely that, in such circumstances, a court would find 
that there was no duty owed if the patient was in control of his or her 
mental capacities and had the financial ability to remove him or herself 
from the services of the medical staff. Therefore, the principle adopted 
by Martin CJ would have to constitute some form of exception, the 
basis for which remains uncertain. 
The second approach to limiting the circumstances where a patient is under 
the charge of a health professional is based on the question of consent. 
It is argued that if consent to medical treatment were not considered 
to be a prerequisite to the existence of the medical professional’s duty 
to provide treatment, the principle of self-determination and patient 
autonomy would be abrogated. The emphatic view of the Western 
Australian Law Reform Commission in its 1991 report was that valid, 
informed refusal to provide consent relieves a health professional 
of his or her duty to a patient to provide that treatment.97 Therefore, 
once competent adults validly refuse to consent to a particular form 
of treatment, they are no longer under the charge of the treating health 
professional. As the mechanism by which the patient is under the charge 
of the health professional is generally contractual,98 it is arguable that 
the competent patient, irrespective of their age or physical incapacities, 
is always free to withdraw from such charge.99 The contract could be 
97 West Australia Law Reform Commission Medical Treatment for the Dying 
Project No 84 (1991) [1.11] and [1.12].
98 A doctor is not generally bound to take on any patient and, in relation to 
competent adults, the relationship will generally be contractual. There may 
be instances, however, where a doctor’s Hippocratic oath, requires him/
her to ‘rescue’ a stranger; see Lowns v Woods [1996] Aust Torts Reports 
81–376. The relationship of a patient and a public treatment facility may 
not be strictly contractual, although a patient’s right to withdraw from the 
care exists.
99 See, eg, Zada Lipman, ‘The Criminal Liability of Medical Practitioners for 
Withholding Treatment from Severely Defective Newborn Infants’ (1986) 
60 The Australian Law Journal 286, 292.
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interpreted as the provision of medical treatment in accordance with 
the instructions and informed consent of the patient, where this can 
be obtained. In fact there is no reason why it could not be argued that 
a patient can withdraw from a health professional’s charge in relation 
to a particular form of treatment, while still remaining in the health 
professional’s charge in relation to other treatments and care including 
the provision of the ‘necessaries of life’. Such an interpretation of the 
duty provision would uphold the entrenched notion of patient autonomy 
by ensuring the wishes of the patient determined his or her own fate, 
but at the same time ensuring that treating practitioners are not held 
criminally responsible for complying with a patient’s request.
This second approach, however, also suffers from a fundamental flaw. 
In the context of the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment, the crux of this approach is that a patient’s consent to die 
relieves the health provider of any criminal responsibility. So expressed, 
the approach is at odds with s 284 of the Code which states that ‘[c]
onsent by a person to the causing of the person’s own death does not 
affect the criminal responsibility of any person by whom such death 
is caused.’100 That section is one of general application and there is no 
reason to suggest that it does not apply where a homicide offence is 
based on the failure to perform a duty as set out in the Code. In fact, its 
position within the Code would suggest otherwise.   
C  Relevant Excuses under the Code
As s 285 may apply in circumstances where a medical professional 
withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment at the request of a 
competent patient, it is therefore necessary to consider whether any of 
the exculpatory provisions of the Code are of possible application. The 
excuse that is most likely to apply is that contained in s 282 of the 
Code. As stated above, this section was the subject to significant change 
when the Queensland Parliament passed the Criminal Code (Medical 
Treatment) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld). The amended section reads:  
282 Surgical operations and medical treatment
‘(1) A person is not criminally responsible for performing or 
providing, in good faith and with reasonable care and skill, a 
surgical operation on or medical treatment of—
(a) a person or an unborn child for the patient’s benefit; or 
100 The provision can also be found in the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 261. 
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(b) a person or an unborn child to preserve the mother’s 
life;
if performing the operation or providing the medical 
treatment is reasonable, having regard to the patient’s state 
at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.
The most significant amendment to the section was the expansion of its 
application, not only to the adverse consequences of a surgical operation, 
but also to the adverse consequences of ‘medical treatment’. The term 
‘medical treatment’ is not defined; however, the term could encompass 
not only positive acts but also decisions not to administer treatment. 
Take for example the case of Burke v The General Medical Council101 
where the Court was presented with evidence that the provision of 
artificial nutrition and hydration may increase the pain and suffering 
of patients with certain forms of cancer and severe and deteriorating 
dementia.102 In such circumstances the appropriate medical treatment to 
relieve pain and suffering would be the withdrawal or failure to provide 
nutrition and hydration. 
If it is accepted that medical treatment includes withholding or 
withdrawal of treatment, then s 282 substantially alleviates the conflict 
between a patient’s common law rights and the duty imposed on a 
health professional under s 285. A medical professional who withheld or 
withdrew life-sustaining treatment would not be criminally responsible, 
provided he or she acted in good faith, with reasonable care and skill, and 
the decision was ‘reasonable, having regard to the patient’s state at the 
time, and to all the circumstances of the case’. It is the last requirement 
that would ensure that the conflict between a patient’s common law 
rights and a health professional’s duty under the Code would not be 
entirely reconciled. A patient’s consent to treatment is a relevant factor 
in determining whether a decision to withdraw or withhold treatment 
was reasonable. Martin CJ in Rossiter103 stated that: 
Plainly the phrase ‘all the circumstances of the case’ is quite 
broad enough to include the informed decision of a mentally 
competent patient. Having regard to the common law 
principles of self-determination to which I have referred, it 
is clearly ‘reasonable’ to act in accordance with the informed 
101 [2004] EWHC 1879.
102 [2004] EWHC 1879 [19],[20]. 
103 [2009] WASC 229.
116 Mandy Shircore and Malcolm Barrett 
decision of a mentally competent patient who refuses to 
consent to medical treatment.104  
It is submitted that the patient’s informed consent is not the only 
or determining factor when considering whether the decision was 
reasonable. The language of s 259 of the Criminal Code (WA) and 
the equivalent s 282(1) of the Code (Qld) suggest otherwise. First, the 
section refers to all the circumstances, which strongly suggests that there 
is more than one factor to be considered. Secondly, the section makes no 
reference to consent. If it were intended that consent could be the sole 
or determining factor then the section could have been so expressed. 
Therefore, factors such as the patient’s pain and suffering, the likelihood 
that the patient will recover, the likelihood of deterioration and the life 
expectancy of the patient could also be factors that determine whether 
the decision was reasonable.      
The palliative care excuse set out in s 282A may, in certain circumstances, 
also apply to a health professional who withholds or withdraws 
life-sustaining treatment at the request of a patient.105 However, its 
application is limited as palliative care is defined to mean care directed 
at maintaining or improving a patient’s comfort in circumstances where, 
if not for the care, the patient would be subjected to pain and suffering. 
Only in exceptional circumstances such as those referred to in Burke 
v The General Medical Council106 would withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment come within the definition of palliative care. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the accused must not intend, by way 
of their care, to kill the patient may also prove to restrict the section’s 
application to situations of withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment. 
104 [2009] WASC 229, [44].
105 For a comprehensive discussion of the palliative care excuse see Ben White 
and Lindy Willmott ‘The Edge of Palliative Care: Certainty, but at What 
Price?’ (2004) 7 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 225; Andrew McGee, 
‘Double Effect in the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld): A Critical Appraisal’ 
(2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 
46.
106 [2004] EWHC 1879, [19]‒[20].
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v  tHe need foR RefoRM?
The above analysis argues that health professionals are able to withdraw 
or withhold life-sustaining treatment pursuant to an advanced health 
directive or the directive of a substitute decision maker in accordance 
with the GAA without the risk of criminal liability. As stated this 
conclusion is reached because the decision to withdraw or withhold 
treatment can only be made at a time when such treatment is no longer a 
necessary of life. There is greater uncertainty as to the application of the 
Code provisions when a health professional complies with a competent 
patient’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment in circumstances where 
that patient is not in the final stage of a terminal illness and is not in 
pain or suffering.  
This analysis, however, rests on a number of assumptions about how 
Code provisions will be interpreted. The presumptions include that 
the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment will be 
classified as an omission to act, rather than a positive act of commission. 
Further that all life-sustaining treatment will be considered medical 
treatment including the provision of artificial hydration and nutrition. 
Also a health professional will not be under a duty to provide such 
treatment to an incompetent patient in circumstances where the 
provisions of the GAA have been followed. With respect to a competent 
patient that she or he is not under the charge of a health professional, 
although the circumstances in which this will be the case are unclear. 
Finally, there is also uncertainty as to the application of s 282 of the 
Code to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
whether the patient is competent or not. Without certainty many health 
professionals may well be reluctant to comply with a patient’s request 
and, consequently, a time consuming and expensive process of seeking 
judicial clarification will become more common. It is therefore desirable 
that Parliament legislate to clarify the law. 
A  The Western Australian Legislative Response
As stated above, the Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) 
Act 2008 (WA), amongst other things, amended the Code in that State 
to address the question of a medical professional’s responsibility for 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Section 259 of 
the Criminal Code (WA) as amended includes the following: 
(2) A person is not criminally responsible for not 
administering or ceasing to administer, in good faith and 
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with reasonable care and skill, surgical or medical treatment 
(including palliative care) if not administering or ceasing to 
administer the treatment is reasonable, having regard to the 
patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the 
case.107
It is suggested that the terms ‘reasonableness’, and ‘all the circumstances 
of the case’ provide a broad but not sufficiently defined excuse for 
criminal liability arising from a breach of the duty provisions. Importantly 
the provision fails to clarify the relevance of a patient consent in 
determining criminal responsibility. Furthermore, the question as to the 
reasonableness of the treatment remains one for the jury.
Despite this, the enactment of such a provision sends a clear message to 
health professionals that parliament has provided an excuse specifically 
directed to the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining measures. 
The fact that parliament has sought to clarify the law in such a way 
arguably also provides the impetus for judges to usurp the role of the 
jury in providing declaratory relief that a proposed withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures would not attract criminal responsibility.  
Notwithstanding that s 259(2) does not put beyond doubt that a health 
professional is excused from acting pursuant to the informed request of 
a patient, Martin CJ in Rossiter,108 held that, if his interpretation of the 
duty provision was incorrect, s 259(2) provided the plaintiff with an 
excuse for discontinuing treatment in accordance with the defendant’s 
request. His Honour stated that the ‘entire thrust of the legislation 
which resulted in the introduction of subsection (2) of s 259 was aimed 
at giving force and effect to the common law principle of autonomy 
and self-determination… [i]t would be utterly inconsistent with the 
legislative objective to construe s 259 as detracting from that common 
law position’.109 His Honour also finds support for his conclusion in the 
Second Reading Speech of the Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical 
Treatment) Bill 2006. The Hon Sue Ellery stated that: 
Furthermore, the law in relation to the withdrawal or 
withholding of life-sustaining measures in circumstances 
of terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness, and the 
provision of palliative care, is perceived as uncertain and 
107 Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) Act 2008 (WA) s 18. 
108 [2009] WASC 229 [43].  
109 [2009] WASC 229 [48].  
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as not providing sufficient protection to health professionals 
involved in end-of-life decision making and treatment. The 
principle of personal autonomy is central to the bill. The 
bill establishes a simple, flexible scheme whereby persons 
can ensure that, in the event that they become mentally 
incompetent and require medical treatment for any condition, 
including a terminal illness, their consent, or otherwise, to 
specified treatment can be made clear in an advance health 
directive and or alternatively treatment decisions can be 
made by an enduring guardian chosen by them. The bill also 
clarifies the circumstances in which consent can be given 
or refused in the absence of an advanced health directive, a 
guardian or an enduring guardian, and clarifies and expands 
the protection from criminal and civil liability given to health 
professionals. 110 
As noted, while the enactment of s 259(2) and the decision in Rossiter 
will provide some comfort to Western Australian health professionals 
who are requested to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, 
the inclusion of the requirement that the decisions be reasonable 
‘having regard to all the circumstances of the case’ does leave open 
the possibility that a future decision by a court of criminal jurisdiction 
would not give the patient’s consent the pre-eminence given to it 
in Rossiter.111 It is certainly unlikely that a criminal court would be 
prepared to read the sections of the Code in light of the common law.112 
Furthermore, to the extent to which reference can be made to second 
reading speeches in interpreting the Code, the speech does not entirely 
support his Honour’s conclusion. The statements with respect to self-
determination and autonomy are made in reference to a patient who is 
terminally ill or permanently unconscious. 
110 Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) Bill 2006, Second 
Reading Hon Sue Ellery (6 December 2006) p 9244
111 It is certainly unlikely that a criminal court would be prepared to read the 
sections of the Code in light of the common law, an interpretation method 
inconsistent with principles of Code interpretation. See Brennan v R (1936) 
55 CLR 253, 263; R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1, 31–32; and Charlie v The 
Queen (1999) 199 CLR 387, 394. 
112 The interpretation method deployed by Martin CJ would certainly appear 
to be inconsistent with principles of Code interpretation: see Brennan v 
R (1936) 55 CLR 253, 263; R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1, 31–32; and 
Charlie v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 387, 394. 
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It is suggested therefore that greater clarification is required. One 
possible way of achieving clarity is to amend the s 259(2) excuse to 
give primacy to the patient’s consent. This could be achieved by simply 
adding the words ‘is at the request by or on behalf of a patient or’113 
immediately after the words ‘not administering or ceasing to administer 
the treatment.’ 
The enactment in Queensland of a subsection in similar terms to that 
enacted in Western Australia, which included the suggested amendments, 
giving primacy to consent and patient autonomy, would provide an 
excuse of general application that would be applicable not only to 
a breach of s 285 but also to a breach of the other duty provisions. 
Furthermore, in the highly unlikely event that the courts reject the 
Bland principle that the withdrawal or withholding of treatment is an 
omission or that life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances is 
not a necessity of life, the excuse would in any event apply to exculpate 
a health professional.  
vi  conclusion
Despite the lack of prosecutions,114 the ambiguity in the criminal law 
has the potential to influence the practice of health professionals. It is 
therefore important that any actual or potential conflict between a patient’s 
common law rights and the duties imposed on health professionals be 
resolved. As the population ages and medical technologies continue to 
improve, decisions regarding when people should be allowed to die 
will become more common. To allay fears regarding the legality of 
conduct of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, and 
to ensure that ‘society’s notions of what is the law and what is right … 
coincide[s]’,115 it is submitted that the Criminal Code of Queensland 
should be amended by including a subsection similar to s 259 (2) of the 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA). As argued above, however, it is important 
113 Further clarification could specify that a request on behalf of a patient must 
come from a substitute decision maker pursuant to the GAA, and that the 
request by a patient includes an advanced health directive. Furthermore, 
the legislature could specify whether a request by a patient must be an 
informed request.   
114 See Corns, above n 7. Chris Corns refers to one prosecution in Victoria in 
1996 of a nurse who removed a breathing tube from a patient. Due to the 
inability to prove causation the judge directed an acquittal of the accused. 
115 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) [1993] AC 789, 877 (Lord Lowry).
121Uncomfortable Bedfellows
that any such amendment give primacy to the role of the patient’s consent 
in determining whether a health professional’s decision to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment was culpable. 
